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Pt3.Ch6.Sb2 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘The Calculus’. summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 6: Hegel and Deleuze on Ontology and the Calculus

Subdivision 1: The Calculus

Brief Summary:

Deleuze’s and Hegel’s anti-representationalist philosophies can be compared on the basis of their different interpretations of differential calculus and Kant’s antinomies.

Summary

Calculus deals with “quantities whose relations to one another vary.” (162) Somers-Hall deals mostly with speed, the relation of time to distance. Early developments in the study of rates of change come from Oresme. To find velocity, draw a graph with time as one axis and distance traveled as the other. To determine the speed we look at change in distance over change in time, which also gives us a diagonal between those time-space coordinates on the graph. This only gives us average velocity. If we wanted to know the velocity at any moment, it would have to be at constant speed. But for motion with inconstant velocity, we cannot use this method. Instead we need to draw a tangent to the curve to determine the velocity at that moment. But a point cannot have a direction. Leibniz’s solution is to begin with the diagonal between the point in question and some other arbitrarily selected point (which gives the average velocity within the bounds of that time frame), and then bring the arbitrary point infinite close to the one in question. This slides the diagonal to indicate the velocity at that point. In fact, we can do this merely working with the graph’s functions in their numerical form. (163d)

For Hegel, calculus’ method is expressed in the formula [see §608 of this entry]

or

The second one is the gradient function for a curve, change in x over change in y. Let’s first examine

(Thanks Dr. Siddique / faculty.uncfsu.edu)

So the i  on the bottom is the x value. And our function gives us y = f(x). So we will find the y values by using the function formula. On the top, we have two applications of the function. The second one tells us what point along the y axis is right above the first x value.

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Clark & Chalmer’s Extended Mind

 

 

I Introduction

The authors explain they will advocate “an active externalism, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes.” (2) [Cited pages in accordance with online pdf http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/clark/pubs/TheExtendedMind.pdf]

 

II.

x
x

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Deleuze Cinema, BK1 Ch1 Pt1 Pr1 Movement thesis 1 intro: space is distinct from movement.

 

by Corry Shores
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[Central Entry Directory]
[Cinema Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Cinema Explication Project Directory]

[The following is summary; original text is given below. My own comments are in brackets.]

[Citation format:
(C1: [1983 French]; [1986 English]; [2005 English])
(C2: [1985 French]; [1989 English]; [2005 English])
Page break: ‘||’ for 2005 English, otherwise ‘|’ ]

 

Gilles Deleuze

Cinema 1
Cinéma 1

Ch1
Theses on Movement: First Commentary on Bergson
Thèses sur le mouvement: premier commentaire de bergson

Pt1
Première thèse: le mouvement et l’instant
First thesis: movement and instant

Pr1
Movement thesis 1 intro: space is distinct from movement

Summary

 

Bergson has three theses of movement.

Thesis 1: Movement is distinct from the space covered.

We cannot consider movement and space as being of the same sort of thing. They are essentially different.

 

The temporality of space and motion in the first thesis on movement:

a) Space is past, it is what has previously been covered by the movement.

b) Movement is present, it is the act of covering which secondarily produces space, temporally speaking.

 

The metrics of space and motion:

a) The space covered is divisible into qualitatively homogeneous parts. [One meter of distance is divisible into two half meters of distance.] In face, space is infinitely divisible into parts.

b) Movement is indivisible in this sense, or at least we can say that  if we do divide it, the parts are heterogeneous: “movement […] cannot be divided without changing qualitatively each time it is divided.” [Movement is like complete change and not just change in place. Spatial distance does not measure the change of movement, it measures the change of place. Movement is more than displacement. Movement is not constant departure of place, rather it is constant departure of state. The status of things is constantly altering. In physical motion, there is both the qualitative change of state of the things in motion (and the whole of all things), but as well, there is the change in place.]

“the spaces covered all belong to a single, identical, homogeneous space, while the movements are heterogeneous, irreducible among themselves.”

 

 

Deleuze, Gilles. Cinéma 1: L'image-mouvement. Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1983.

Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. Transl. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam, London / New York: Athlone; Minnesota: University of Minnesota, 1986.

Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. Transl. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam, London / New York: Athlone, 1986; Continuum 2005.

live

welles

http://youtu.be/w9b7MWtd3mk

<iframe width="640" height="480" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/w9b7MWtd3mk" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Corry Shores, Entry Directory]

The following presentation was scheduled for the 2012 Deleuze Studies Conference in New Orleans. A canceled flight prevented me from giving it. Yet I highly recommend it. And because it is liberated from its actual occurrence, I am expanding it to include an Andy Kaufman section. The work here is in part inspired by jtriley's response to one of my blog entries. At the end I will place extra discussion to make this into a promised reply to jtriley's post. 

Corry Shores

Who's the Real Paul Masson? Personal Non-Identity in Deleuze's Orson Welles

Orson Welles had difficulty obtaining funding for his movies, so he raised his own money through acting

He even did commercial advertisements.

Yet we can hear in his infamous “frozen peas” outtakes that this was not always his favorite form of acting.

 

Later he endorsed Paul Masson wine in television commercials. We will see in the outtakes that he reads from a script. So he is acting. But the character he portrays is still himself, still Orson Welles. And his job is to represent the product. If we drink enough of Paul Masson, we become drunk. In these outtakes, is Orson Welles intoxicated? Or is he perhaps faking or acting drunk? 

 

The final version uses the footage but with overdubbed audio. Does it feel like a more authentic presentation of Paul Masson wine? We compare the two and wonder, who’s the real Paul Masson? 

 

Both versions were scripted for Welles; both are false self-portrayals in a sense. But did we feel that the first one was more real or had more power of authenticity of some sort? And what about the humor in this parody? Does it not seem like an honest, and yet, original presentation? 

 

These clips serve to introduce our main theme of the originating power of the false. We will combine Deleuze’s writings on determinability in the third synthesis of time with his explanation of Orson Welles’ notion of fakery. Somehow, fakery as forgery or as role-acting can be productive of our authentic self-becoming and it is based on the temporal immediacy of the now and the next. Self-falsification might be how we continuously vary from ourselves, and it could rest upon the paradoxical structure of time. Let’s begin first by noting that Orson Welles considered himself a magician. 

 

He explains:

 

Fortune telling as stage magic is as well fakery for Welles. Yet this falsification can magically transform the performer into someone too close to the real.

 

The fakery became real through the acting. Forgery can somehow be authenticity. Welles’ film F for Fake is partly a documentary on real life painting-forger Elmyr.

 

So normally we think of the forgery as coming after the model it falsifies. Yet there is way for self-creative originality to be produced through forged falsification. Consider Welles’ infamous War of the Worlds radio broadcast. It had every appearance of a normal music radio show that is periodically interrupted by progressively unsettling news flashes that detail an alien invasion. Millions of listeners panicked, thinking the invasion was real.

 

Now, notice how Welles confesses he uses normal broadcasting conventions. Then also note that the second reporter thought Welles’ faked broadcast seemed more real than normal ones. 

 

Yet, the broadcast’s believability is not its production of reality. There have since been recreative variations of it for example, similar techniques but with different content. Although it began as a forgery, as a fake news story, it nonetheless became a real dramatic form inspiring other variations and tributes. Regarding Welles’ fakery, Deleuze writes:

 

“the forger cannot be reduced to a simple copier, nor to a liar, because what is false is not simply a copy, but already the model. [...] the artist, even Vermeer, even Picasso, is a forger, since he makes a model with appearances, even if the next artist gives the model back to appearances in order to make a new model [...]”

 Now, fakery as the creation of reality has the temporality of becoming. Deleuze writes

 

“it is so difficult to define ‘the’ forger, because we do not take into account his multiplicity, his ubiquity, and because we are content to refer to a historical and ultimately chronological time. But everything is changed in the perspective of time as becoming.” 

To illustrate the ‘pure event’ of becoming, Deleuze recalls the scenes in Alice’s Wonderland when her body rapidly expands.

As she becomes larger, she of course becomes larger than the size she just was. But in that same stroke, she is as well ‘becoming smaller’ than the sizes she is now growing into. If we are assuming she will continue her growth, then in the next moment, she will be larger; but, that coming largerness is still smaller than the even larger size that comes after that. So it is not that Alice is larger and smaller than herself. Rather, Alice is becoming larger and smaller than herself. 

"Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a becoming […]. becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future."

 Deleuze third synthesis of time is the synthesis of the future: it synthesizes the now with the next, and he roots his account in Kant’s critical analysis of Descartes’ cogito argument, I think, therefore I am. We will put aside many of its complexities to focus on the concept of determinability, which is like the infinitely tight crack that temporally differentiates the now from the next while at the same time bringing them together into absolute immediacy. 

 

To illustrate self-consciousness as a disjunctive synthesis with our now and our next, Deleuze turns to the story of Actaeon’s transformation. After he happened upon goddess Diana bathing naked in the wood, she turned him into a deer. He becomes aware of this when seeing his new animal form reflected in the water. Actaeon both recognizes it is himself, for it is his self staring back at him, while at the same time, he must recognize himself as becoming something completely different than who he had been right up until then. In a manner of speaking, to be self-conscious means we must look in the water and see a dear, and yet still identify with that other, as if to say, “that is me, but who am I?” Being a self means being an other to oneself. Now consider our first time jumping into deep water. At the moment of the leap, we in a way have determined ourselves as being a capable swimmer. However, we have not yet reached the water and actualized our new status. In that passage between states, we affirm our determinability, our always being glued to the other self we are becoming. Consider then Deleuze’s discussion of the relay characters in Welles’ Mr. Arkardin. Because of how each character follows the other in succession with all being odd but in their own ways, they seem to be a series of metamorphoses, as if one character hands off the baton to the next in a relay race. 

 

Do we not undergo metamorphoses throughout our lives, as if we as well hand off the baton from one state of ourselves to the following different one? Each runner is different, but all are connected by a chain of direct contacts. We see this sort of determinability in Rosenberg Cool Hand Luke. When Luke claims he can eat 50 eggs, he is not then really such a person, because no one has done it before. Yet by making the declaration, he glues himself to his forthcoming self-variation, and in that way affirms his determinability. 

Is this something like acting or like making oneself a forgery? Consider this clip of Welles passing himself off as Churchill, who was passing himself off as Welles, who was passing himself off as Othello. 

 

Acting as someone we are not can in many cases be a source of vitality and growth, and an inherent part of every moment of our lives. Perhaps we have some control over our self-forgeries and we may guide ourselves toward worthwhile and vital selves to become. Let’s now end with a celebrity roast. Welles, like all other participants of these shows, makes light of the celebrities with slightly insulting jabs. But no so for Jimmy Stewart. Welles instead roasts other actors lacking Stewart’s courage to give anti-violent male portrayals. When we emulate admirable traits even to the degree of mimicry, now really, would this be inauthenticity? Or is there another standard at work? Could not fraudulent self-forgeries be evaluated according to the vitality, originality, and constructive self-creativity they produce? , would insult the celebrity in the roast. But not so for Jimmy Stewart. His jokes were directed at those unlike Stewart, the rest was praise, admiration, and declaration of the worthiness of becoming more like him. 

Deleuze Clips for Julie

Deleuze abecedaire F

temporary m,oby dick deleuze reference for research purposes

Moby Dick

71

It is Herman Melville who, in his novels , fixed this structure for all time. seed impregnating the sea, the ship is caught between its two crystalline faces: a limpid face which is the ship from above, where everything should be visible, according to order; an opaque face which is the ship from below, and which occurs underwater, the black face of the engine-room stokers. But it is as if the lipid face actualizes a kind of theatre or dramaturgy which takes hold of the passengers themselves, whilst the virtual passes into the opaque face, and is actualized in turn in the settling of scores between engineers, in the demonic perversity of a boatswain, in a a captain's obsession, in the secret revenge of insurgent blacks. This is the circuit of two virtual images which continually become actual in relation to each other, and are continually revived. It is not so much Huston's Moby Dick which gives the cinematographic version of the ship, but rather Welles'The Lady from /Shanghai, in which the majority fo the fomrs of the crystal-image are undoubtedly to be found: the yacht called 'The Circe' reveals a visible face and an invisible face, a limpid face that for a moment the naive hero allows himself to be caugt by, while the other face, the opaque one, the great dark stage of the aquarium of monsters, rises in silence and grows as the first one becomes vague or blurred.

good ship

27

[Deleuze does not refer to anything in this movie, but here are some scenes, which might illustrate vaguely the notion of the limpid and opaque sides of the ship.]

dark

29.40 ahab room

48.00 behind mask, before dancing, maybe light dark

5100 nest light?

1 00 00 talk below about not mutiny probem

1.0500 sun

1.29.00 electrical charge, maybe dark side

Huston. Moby Dick 1.wmv

Huston. Moby Dick. 2.wmv

Huston. Moby Dick. 3.wmv

exhalation



SmiLe SmILe SmiLE
____________________________
Bridging lip over sea b air this song
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bridging

inspiration




inspiratie

Making Your Hands Become Different

by Scott Wollschleger

[Other Entries in the Differential Music History Series]

Carl Czerny
1791 – 1857

Individuality is difference.

The expression of a self emerges from the power which is difference itself.

Individuation is created through a process of differentiation.
Individuation is differentiation.

What makes a difference?

Czerny - a machine composer.

His question to us is, "How do I continually differentiate the music?”. The technique itself has to become different throughout. It does this by remaining the “same” in one sense while changing in another. One sense will say, " Yes, this again". Yet, the other sense will force our hand to change its relationship to the keyboard, as if to say, “No, this must be different now”.

Technique is developed through the increase of connective differences communicating throughout the living hand and body. Czerny helps our hands become different from themselves.

The Differential Music History Series, Entry Directory

Scott Wollschleger

Differential Music History

1. Making Your Hands Become Different

Engineer Études, 1: The Combinatorics of Raw Expression

[Note: The following here is a poetic mechanical marvel by Clifford Duffy called cărbune.
http://antioedipus.blogspot.com/2011/04/raw-raw-coal-carbune.html
Please see it there! I reproduced it here for technical analysis. I make my observations about it here: Word-Engine Fueling: Clifford Duffy's cărbune
http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/04/word-engine-fueling-clifford-duffys.html.
As always, we thank you Clifford Duffy.
Perhaps soon we will analyze its technical magic.]



Song now Now singing

song Now

exhalation



SmiLe SmILe SmiLE

____________________________

Bridging lip over sea b air this song


dance|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||



bridging



inspiration










inspiratie

____________________________________



NOW



I'm hearing your voice,

your NOW inside of me.

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exhalation

SmiLe SmILe SmiLE

SInging

dance

sideways

expiratie inspiratie

NOW




I'm hearing your voice,

your NOW inside of me.your voice mybody in

Sing now _______________________________________________ the

blanket inhalation

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NOW

Now beSi de me / Voice/ Hip/ besideme Insid e you for you

I'm hearing your voice,

InSide of me Inside you YouInSide your NOW inside of me.